A Perspective from Japan
Propaganda Wars: The Self-Defense Force’s “Successful” Missile Intercept Test
Cultural News, February 2008
By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst
Translated by Alan Gleason
On January 11, Japan’s new Special Anti-Terrorism Law, touted by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as its top priority during an extraordinary session of Parliament, was voted down by the opposition-controlled Upper House. That same day the LDP forced the bill through the Lower House, where it commands a two-thirds majority, for a second time. Under the Japanese Constitution, this allows the bill to become law.
Despite these strong-arm tactics, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) abandoned earlier threats to submit a censure motion against Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in the Upper House. Censure, the scenario went, would prevent Fukuda from participating in Upper House deliberations, forcing him to dissolve the Lower House and call for a general election.
So why did the DPJ drop its censure plan? The party’s official reason was that it wanted to wait for a more appropriate occasion in late March, when the LDP will be struggling to pass bills on even more unpopular issues, the national pension scandal and extension of the gasoline tax.
More likely, however, the DPJ itself does not feel ready for a general election just yet. Also, looking ahead to its own future prospects as ruling party, it does not want to set a precedent for exercising the censure option every time the Upper and Lower Houses split on a vote.
Meanwhile, however, another defense-related controversy threatens to erupt. The government appeared to score a propaganda coup of sorts on December 18 when an SM-3 missile fired from the Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Kongo, recently outfitted with an Aegis missile defense system, intercepted a U.S.-launched missile in a joint test conducted in the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii.
TV news programs showed Defense Ministry officials in the missile control room applauding and shaking hands as the target exploded. Claims were made that Japan could now protect itself against North Korea’s Nodong missile, which has a radius of 800 miles.
However, the SM-3 fired in the Pacific test only has a radius of 250 miles. To use it to intercept a Nodong, those test conditions would have to be duplicated. An Aegis-equipped destroyer would have to be positioned directly under the path of the incoming missile, which would have to be launched at a prearranged time and flown at a prescribed altitude of about 80 miles.
North Korea has about 200 Nodongs installed on mobile, trailer-style launch pads in a network of underground tunnels. Once brought up to the surface, a Nodong can be prepared for launch in a matter of hours, and can reach a target in Japan in seven to ten minutes. If Japan’s Aegis ships are all in port, or on exercises somewhere other than the Japan Sea, they will be too far away to respond to a missile fired from North Korea.
Despite these caveats, Japan’s mass media was quick to declare the December test a “success,” and this has the country’s defense establishment worried. Officials fear that when citizens learn the truth about the test’s limitations, they will accuse the Defense Ministry of engaging in a propaganda ploy -- a scheme to delude the public about a missile defense system that is currently budgeted at over nine billion U.S. dollars.
Motoaki Kamiura is a Tokyo-based military analyst. When the world is in crisis, he appears frequently on national television programs.
Alan Gleason is an editor, writer, and Japanese-English translator. He lives in Tokyo.